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T HE SUBJECT of student instruction and the legal and factual
problems arising out of this activity have received a certain
amount of judicial scrutiny over the years. The other two sub-
jects to be considered here (aerobatics and sport aviation), how-
ever, have not as yet occupied the judiciary to any significant ex-
tent, so that there is a paucity of decisions to consider. The pur-
pose and scope of this paper is of necessity, therefore, limited.
Future years will undoubtedly find the courts dealing more and
more with problems arising out of aerobatic flight and the variety
of activities which can be considered within the category of "sport
aviation."
It will come as no surprise to any reader of this article that
private aircraft are becoming increasingly popular as a mode of
transportation in today's affluent society. It will be equally be-
lievable to the reader that in 1978 there exist a substantial number
of thrill seekers in our society who seek "kicks" by engaging in
activities loosely encompassed (and to purists uncomfortably so)
within the definition of "sports aviation." Activities such as hang
gliding, skydiving, and others not yet dreamed of are examples of
conduct which will be the subjects of future decisions, regulations,
and of great concern to those with less of the daredevil in them. It
is quite surprising how little regulation of these activities exists
at the present time.
II. AEROBATICS
According to recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
* Ph.B., 1950, Loyola Univ.-Chicago; J.D., 1961, Loyola Univ.-Los An-
geles;- Attorney at Law, Los Angeles, Cal.
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statistics there are approximately 744,000 pilots in the United
States, including approximately 189,000 student pilots.' In ad-
dition, there are almost 180,000 small aircraft registered in the
United States.! Of these pilots and aircraft, probably less than
five percent are involved in aerobatic or sport aviation flying.' With
the increase in light aviation already experienced and with that to
be expected in the future, there has been and will be a concomitant
upsurge in aerobatic or acrobatic flying."
The most surprising (some might say shocking) aspect of aero-
batic flying is the minimal regulation of it by the government.
What regulation exists is limited principally to some very mini-
mal restrictions on the pilot and the manfuacturers. The regu-
lations applicable to the pilot have nothing to do with his qualifi-
cations to engage in this obviously hazardous activity, but only
where he can perform such maneuvers. Federal Aviation Regu-
lation (FAR) 91.71 provides as follows:
ACROBATIC FLIGHT
No person may operate an aircraft in acrobatic flight-
(a) Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement;
(b) Over an open air assembly of persons;
(c) Within a control zone or Federal airway;
(d) Below an altitude of 1,500 feet above the surface; or
(e) When flight visibility is less than three miles.
For the purposes of this section, acrobatic flight means an inten-
tional maneuver involving an abrupt change in an aircraft's atti-
tude, an abnormal attitude, or abnormal acceleration, not neces-
sary for normal flight.'
A somewhat related regulation is FAR 91.15 which, in perti-
nent part, provides:
(c) Unless each occupant of the aircraft is wearing an approved
parachute, no pilot of a civil aircraft, carrying any person (other
than a crewmember) may execute any intentional maneuver that
exceeds-
I U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, FAA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF AVIATION,
CALENDAR YEAR 1976 at 90 (1978).
2Id. at 112.
'See id.; U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, FAA 1975 GENERAL AVIATION
AcTIvITY SURVEY 12 (1976).
' The terms "aerobatic" and "acrobatic" are used interchangeably throughout
this article.
5 14 C.F.R. § 91.71 (1977).
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(1) A bank of 600 relative to the horizon; or
(2) A nose-up or nose-down attitude of 301 relative to the
horizon.
(d) Paragraph (c) of this section does not apply to-
(1) Flight tests for pilot certification or rating; or
(2) Spins and other flight maneuvers required by the regula-
tions for any certificate or rating when given by-
(i) A certificated flight instructor; or
(ii) An airline transport pilot instructing in accordance with
§ 61.169 of this chapter."
The regulations can otherwise be searched in vain for any that
state what qualifications must be demonstrated by a pilot before
he can perform acrobatic maneuvers. Interestingly enough, de-
monstration of spins is not only not a requirement for a private
or commercial pilot's certificate,' but the normal category aircraft
utilized in student instruction are placarded against the perfor-
mance of an intended spin.8 As FAR 91.15(c)' implies, instruc-
tions in spin and spin recovery are required under some circum-
stances, most notably when a pilot is seeking a flight instructor's
certificate with an airplane or glider instructor rating.'"
Presently, therefore, we have a regulatory gap which allows a
pilot to engage in maneuvers which most certainly test his ability
to a degree far greater than that required for his private pilot's cer-
tificate. Yet this pilot, unskilled as he may be, is within the con-
fines of the regulations in maneuvering an aircraft throughout its
flight envelope" to the very ragged edge of the performance curve
of that aircraft and perhaps beyond the edge to disaster.
As an example, let's consider for a moment this hypothetical
case:
R. Baron, a private pilot with a grand total of 90 hours, perhaps
50 of which are as pilot in command, through an estate sale
6 14 C.F.R. § 91.15(c) and (d) (1977).
7 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.107, 61.127 (1977).
8 14 C.F.R. 5 23.1567(a) (1978). Utility category aircraft must bear a placard
listing those acrobatic maneuvers for which the aircraft is approved. 14 C.F.R.
§ 23.1567(b) (1978).
9 14 C.F.R. § 91.15(c) (1977). See text accompanying note 6, supra.
"'See FAA Advisory Circular No. AC-61-21 (1961) at 115.
" The "flight envelope." is a graphic representation of the various speed and
load combinations which the structure of the aircraft is designed to withstand.
See 14 C.F.R. § 23.333 (1978).
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purchases his first aircraft, a Cessna Aerobat (an acrobatic Model
150). On his initial flight, alone in the aircraft and full of the en-
thusiasm and overwhelming confidence in his ability and skills
which are so often found in the 90 hour pilot, he decides to see
how the aircraft will handle in a loop. At the top of the maneuver
the aircraft stalls out and spins to the ground, killing the intrepid
R. Baron and injuring a bystander in a field. Upon investigation
it is determined that the pilot was in violation of FAR 91.15(c) "
in that he had failed to carry and use a parachute. The investiga-
tion also concludes that no mechanical design or structural defect
contributed to the happening of the accident.
From the material previously cited it can be seen that the pilot
was in violation of no regulation in performing the maneuver itself
(assuming it was not performed in any of the airspaces defined
in FAR 91.711"), but he would be in violation of FAR 91.15(c)1 '
for the failure to wear a parachute. Whether this violation had
anything to do with the proximate cause of the accident is highly
unlikely; however, the violation would undoubtedly be relied on
by the pilot's insurer in denying coverage under its policy for any
claim made on behalf of the injured bystander."
What considerations exist as to the manufacturer of an acro-
batic aircraft? As far as regulations are concerned, there are, of
course, numerous ones contained in FAR Part 23.1" For older
acrobatic aircraft the provisions of Part 3 of the Civil Air Regu-
lations" in many instances will be applicable since, when the air-
craft was manufactured, these regulations were in force and effect
and controlled its manufacture. Naturally, if a violation of any
of these regulations can be shown, there will be a solid basis for
holding the manufacturer liable. On the other hand, compliance
with these regulations does not necessarily exonerate a manufac-
turer from liability since the regulations are admittedly minimum
standards. In order to delineate the complete scope of the manu-
facturer's responsibility then, reference must be made to common
12 14 C.F.R. § 91.15(c) (1977). See text accompanying note 6, supra.
Is 14 C.F.R. S 91.71 (1977). See text accompanying note 5, supra.
14 14 C.F.R. § 91.15(c) (1977). See text accompanying note 6, supra.
1 See Bruce v. Lumberman's Casualty Co., 222 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1955);
Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 704, 712 (1956).
1 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.1 et seq. (1978).
17Former 14 C.F.R. §§ 3.10-3.16, 3.19, 3.62-3.65. See 26 Fed. Reg. 10,698
(1961); 29 Fed. Reg. 17,955 (1964).
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law principles of negligence, warranty and, most importantly of
all, the modem doctrine of strict liability in tort for the marketing
of a defective product.18 It is far beyond the scope of this article
to attempt to summarize the present state of the law in the various
jurisdictions relating to the strict liability doctrine.19
Again, however, by way of an example which can serve illu-
stratively to demonstrate some of the considerations which might
be involved for the manufacturer of an aerobatic aircraft, consider
the very recent pronouncement of the California Supreme Court
in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co." In this case the California
Supreme Court, the court which has been so prominent in formu-
lating the modem doctrine of strict liability, further refined the
approach to a design defect in a product.
[A] product may be found defective in design, so as to subject
a manufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries, under
either of two alternative tests. First, a product may be found de-
fective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Second,
a product may alternatively be found defective in design if the
plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused
his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the rele-
vant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design. 1
The "relevant factors" referred to by the court include, but are
not limited to, the following:
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility
of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved
design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the
consumer that would result from an alternative design."
To top it all off, the court shifted the burden of proof as to the
adequacy of the product's design from the shoulders of the plain-
" See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
29 For a capsule review of the adoption of strict products liability doctrine in
various jurisdictions, see Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967 & Supp. 1977).
2020 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
21 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
2220 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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tiff to the already heavily laden (according to the manufacturers
and their counsel) shoulders of the manufacturer.-
To illustrate, in an admittedly extreme way, how this new ap-
proach might be utilized against the manufacturer of an acrobatic
aircraft, consider another hypothetical. Today most acrobatic air-
craft manufactured come equipped with a "G" meter to advise
the pilot visually how many "G's" he is pulling in a given man-
euver. Acrobatic aircraft, as you might suspect, are built more
sturdily than the normal or utility category aircraft, but still have
"G" limits which cannot be safely exceeded. Thus it is understand-
able that the pilot would want some way of determining when he is
approaching a "G" loading which may exceed the structural in-
tegrity of the aircraft. Regulations provide that acrobatic category
aircraft must have the capacity to withstand flight load factors
of at least six "G's", ' but most of such aircraft are designed (we
trust) to somewhat greater tolerances. Nevertheless, the importance
of providing the pilot some reliable indication of the "G" forces
he is pulling cannot be gainsaid, and thus the "G" meter.
Unfortunately, the physiological effects of "G" loads on the
human body include the phenomena of both "blacking out" and
"redding out." This results in an impairment and sometimes total
loss of the pilot's vision at a "G" loading which probably will be
less than six "G's." Obviously, when this happens a visual indicator
becomes useless. Since hearing remains unaffected by "G" forces,
does the manufacturer then have a duty to install an aural warning
device which will alert the pilot to the fact he is in a hazardous
situation? Leaving aside, for the moment, the obvious warning
which is provided the pilot by impairment of vision itself, the
question posed, at least now in California, can only be answered
by a consideration of the "relevant factors."' The reader will be
left to draw his' own conclusions after applying these factors.
However, note that in California the manufacturer now will have
the burden of establishing to the satisfaction of a jury that when
these factors are applied, the installation of such an added safety
device was not required.
3 Id.
24See generally 14 C.F.R. § 23.321-23.351 (1978).
23 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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III. SPORT AVIATION
As indicated earlier, very few decisions are on the books relating
to the activities involved in so-called sport aviation. A brief dis-
cussion follows, however, relating to some of the activities which
are generally considered to be within the definition of sport avia-
tion, and some of the more significant cases arising out of these
activities are set forth.
A. Parachute Jumping
In an interesting and somewhat unusual case, Dreyer v. United
States," sixteen skydivers who were participating in a high altitude
parachute jump from a B-25 aircraft were killed when they landed
in the waters of Lake Erie. The proximate cause of the accident
was found to be the failure on the part of an FAA radar controller
to properly identify the drop plane. Following the misidentification,
the controller gave the aircraft radar vectors to what was supposed
to be the drop zone. When the signal to drop was given, the aircraft
was five miles out over Lake Erie, ten miles north of the intended
target area. The controller had been following the wrong target
on his radar scope and issuing his vectors to the drop plane based
upon the track of the wrong target. Plaintiffs recovered from the
United States.
There are many skydiving facilities scattered throughout the
United States where individuals may go, receive instructions, and
on the same day perform their first jump. Obviously, potential
liability exists on the part of these entities for inadequate instruc-
tion, unsafe equipment, inadequate aircraft, and sometimes for
negligence in issuing instructions to a descending student. Such
airborne instructions are frequently provided through headsets in
a helmet worn by the skydiver.
The signing of a very broadly worded release, however, is gen-
erally required by these companies before the student's money is
taken and although releases of this nature are suspect in the courts,
it is rather unlikely that the courts in this connection would go
out of their way to find such releases to be against public policy.
Assumption of risk, where still viable as a defense in a given juris-
diction, would obviously be a defense raised to this type of action.
2' 349 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd sub nom. Freeman v. United
States, 509 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1975).
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The inadequacy of handling or treatment following an injury
suffered in a jump might also be pursued in an appropriate case
as a theory of recovery. Certainly the risk of injury is eminently
foreseeable, and skydiving schools and facilities should have train-
ed personnel and at least a modicum of emergency equipment
available on the scene so as to be capable of dealing with such
foreseeable injuries.
Although there is surprisingly little federal regulation controlling
parachuting and skydiving activities, 7 the various states are be-
coming more and more involved in promulgating regulations. In
Hammerlind v. Clear Lake Star Factory Skydivers Club," the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed directed verdicts in favor of
the pilot of an aircraft used in a skydiving exercise and an airport
operator. The case arose out of the death of a parachutist who
drowned when he landed in a lake. The plaintiff charged the pilot
with negligence in permitting the decedent to jump without proper
equipment and charged the airport operator with negligence in
permitting skydivers to use his airport after he purportedly learned
that jumpers were landing in the neighboring countryside, includ-
ing the lake, rather than on target at the airport. The trial court
found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that neither Minnesota
Department of Aeronautics regulations nor the common law im-
posed a duty on the pilot to insure that each skydiver was properly
outfitted. The court felt that this duty fell more to the individuals
involved in instructing the decedent. A Minnesota regulation re-
quired a "Mae West or Coast Guard approved type flotation gear
when parachuting into or within one mile of an open body of
water." Such a device was not worn by the decedent.
The theory against the airport operator was equally unsuccessful.
The court ruled that the fact that jumpers often would land off
the airport premises was not sufficient to impose liability on the
airport for continuing to allow use of its facility. The fact that it
was legally permissible under the Minnesota Department of Aero-
nautics regulations to parachute into a body of water played a
considerable part in the court's reasoning.
27See 14 C.F.R. § 105.1-105.43 (1977).
28258 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 1977).
29 14 M.C.A.R. [Minn. Code of Agency Rules] § 1.0036(k) (1977).
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B. Gliding, Hang Gliding, Ballooning, Etc.
Regulations covering the piloting ratings for these activities
can be found in FAR Part 61." These regulations are extensive
insofar as they relate to the training and experience necessary for
the pilot to acquire the basic and advanced ratings of each cate-
gory. In addition to the Part 61 requirements, the general operat-
ing rules of Part 91"' will apply to the particular activity involved.
Certain specific sections may also be applicable in a given situa-
tion, e.g., FAR 91.17" could come into play if an accident occurred
during the towing of a glider.
No cases of any significance have been found by the author
relating to these activities. The ordinary principles of strict liability
in tort will apply, however, to the manufacturers of gliders, bal-
loons and hang gliders. In light of the earlier discussion concern-
ing the present state of California law, it is interesting to ponder
the potential liability which might exist as against a hang glider
manufacturer for a design defect in its product. In light of the
"relevant factors" set forth in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co." it
is not difficult to imagine liability being established for the failure
to incorporate some relatively modest (in cost at least) safety de-
vices. On a more practical plane, however, it is unlikely that
manufacturers of these products can obtain any products liability
insurance coverage and their assets would undoubtedly be minimal.
IV. STUDENT INSTRUCTION
As a general rule, student instruction will be given by a flight
school which employs certified flight instructors. Such flight schools
are usually operated as part of a fixed base operation at local
fields. Pilots who possess a certified flight instructor's rating can,
of course, give student instruction on their own, but the liability
considerations from a legal standpoint would be identical.
When a student is receiving instruction in an aircraft equipped
with dual controls and his instructor pilot is on board with him,
the instructor pilot is the pilot in command and, as such, entirely
30 14 C.F.R. $§ 61.1 et seq. (1977).
"1 14 C.F.R. $ 91.1 et seq. (1977).
32 14 C.F.R. $ 91.17 (1977).
'20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. He owes a very
high duty of care not only to his student, but also to third persons
and property which could be endangered by the conduct of the
flight. The high standard of care imposed by the courts in this
situation is generally arrived at by analogy to the common carrier
cases.3
One of the leading cases analyzing in detail the duties of flight
schools is Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc.' In this case
the deceased, a commercial pilot with an instructor's rating, under-
took to rent an aircraft from the defendant. As a condition of the
rental he was required to go on a checkout flight with a flight
instructor before being permitted to fly alone in the plane he had
rented. The aircraft was found in a cornfield a short distance from
the runway in an inverted position with both occupants dead. In
determining that the lessor's flight instructor was the pilot in com-
mand, the court declared:
The evidence in the instant case is clear and uncontroverted
that on a checkout flight, even of a commercial pilot, the pilot
being checked out assumes a trainee status and the flight instruc-
tor is the pilot in command. Consequently, if there was negligence
in the operation of the plane, it was proper for the jury to find
the flight instructor, Percy, as the pilot in command, responsible
for this negligence, and therefore to hold the defendant liable.'"
This case and other cases which have involved the "right of
control" issue have relied heavily on FAR 91.3" which provides:
"Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command. (a) The
pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is
the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft."'" In apply-
ing this regulation, the court in Lange held:
The Civil Air Regulations do not and cannot establish rules
for the imposition of liability. However, they do impose duties
and responsibilities which in effect specify the standard of care
that is imposed upon the pilot in command which in turn is im-
34 See Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Haw. 1965), afl'd,
381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967); Linam v. Murphy, 360 Mo. 1140, 232 S.W.2d
937 (1950).
5259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428 (1961).
"108 N.W.2d at 433.
"7 14 C.F.R. S 91.3 (1977).
38 14 C.F.R. S 91.3(a) (1977).
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posed by common law principles in defining negligence. Thus, the
rule applicable to aircraft is that if the aircraft is operated in a
negligent manner, the pilot in command is negligent regardless
of whether or not he is at the controls at the time of the accident,
at least in the absence of extenuating circumstances such as
sudden illness 9
It thus can be seen that, while in other circumstances it is some-
times crucial to establish who is actually operating a dual control
aircraft, in a student instruction situation with the instructing pilot
on board it makes little difference, since the responsibility, in either
event, is wholly possessed by the instructor pilot unless some un-
usual emergency situation exists.
In situations where the student is still undergoing instruction
but flying the aircraft solo, liability can nevertheless exist on the
part of the instructor. An instructor sending a student aloft on
his first solo flight into a traffic pattern known to be extremely
busy could easily be found liable for resulting injuries or death,
not only to the student but to third parties as well. A case similar
on its facts to this situation is Weadock v. Eagle Indemnity Co.,"
where the soloing student sued his flight school for damages he
sustained in a mid-air collision. The flight school was found neg-
ligent in allowing the student to take off while another student
from a competing flight school was in the pattern practicing a
dangerous training maneuver. The resulting mid-air collision was
proximately caused, the court held, by the school's failure to warn
its student of the specific danger involved in that situation. Simi-
larly, if the school provides a defective aircraft to the student,
liability can result.'
As to third parties, a school or instructor may be liable on a
theory of negligent entrustment for permitting a student to embark
upon a flight when not adequately trained or prepared for it, or,
perhaps, when not in a suitable physical or mental condition to in-
sure a safe completion of the flight. In addition, recovery is conceiv-
able upon proof that the training received by the student was inade-
quate. An example of such a case might be an encounter with
39 108 N.W.2d at 432.
1 15 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 1943).
41 See, e.g., Johnston v. Canton Flying Services, Inc., 209 Miss. 226, 46
So. 2d 533 (1950); Aircraft Sales & Service, Inc. v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 52 So. 2d
388 (1951).
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wake turbulence by a low time private pilot carrying a passenger
in the aircraft. If both occupants were killed as a result of this
encounter, a wrongful death action brought on behalf of the pas-
senger's heirs against the pilot's instructor and flight school could
be successful on a showing that no training or warning was ever
given the pilot concerning the phenomenon of wake turbulence
during his training or in the recognized procedures available to
a pilot to avoid such an encounter.
